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BLACKOUT OR BLACKMAIL?
HOW GARBER V. MLB WILL SHED LIGHT
ON MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S
BROADCASTING CARTEL
INTRODUCTION
Baseball fans across North America are all too familiar with seeing
the same message displayed across the screen of their TV, computer,
tablet, or other electronic device: “We’re sorry, this game is not
available in your area.” 1 Even Bud Selig, Major League Baseball’s
longtime commissioner, is not impervious to antiquated and complicated
blackout policies that leave millions of baseball fans in the dark while
league executives, teams, and media outlets continue to bring in billions
of dollars in revenue. 2 Major League Baseball (MLB or the League) and
its member teams can continue to drive up the cost for consumers and
prevent fans from watching their favorite teams through anticompetitive,
exclusive broadcasting license agreements because baseball is in the
unique position of being exempt from antitrust law. 3
In 1922, the Supreme Court held in its landmark ruling, Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Base
Ball Clubs, that professional baseball is exempt from federal antitrust
law. 4 Nearly a century later, the exemption still stands, largely
unchanged, despite Justice Douglas referring to it as “derelict in the
stream of the law,” 5 and Justice Clark stating it “at best was of dubious
validity . . . , unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical.” 6 As the broad
exemption has continued to be upheld by the Supreme Court and various
lower courts, so has the League’s ability to limit the broadcasting of live
games. 7 However, more recent jurisprudence in American Needle v. NFL
on the application of antitrust law to professional sports has put this
McLemore, Sports Blackout Rules Don’t Fit Internet Age,
(Jun. 25, 2012), http://dylanmclemore.com/2012/06/25/sportsblackout-rules-dont-fit-internet-age/.
2. Jeff Passan, Selig’s Promise, YAHOO! SPORTS (July 11, 2006),
http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=jp-blackouts071106 [hereinafter Passan, Selig’s
Promise] (At a 2006 luncheon with the Baseball Writers Association of America, Selig
responded to a question about blackout policies by stating, “I don’t understand (blackouts)
myself . . . . I get blacked out from some games . . . . I don’t know what to do about it. We’ll
figure it out.”).
3. See J. Gordon Hylton, Why Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Still Survives, 9 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 391 (1999).
4. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
208 (1922).
5. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
6. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 450, 452 (1957).
7. Jeff Passan, MLB’s Blackout Problem Keeps Sport in Dark Ages, YAHOO! SPORTS
(Jun. 22, 2012, 10:06 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/mlb%E2%80%99s-blackoutproblem-keeps-sport-in-dark-ages.html [hereinafter Passan, Blackout Problem].
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antitrust exemption in jeopardy. 8 As a result, four fans are taking on the
League to challenge these non-competitive agreements in Garber v.
MLB. 9
This Note contends that the Southern District of New York should
rule in favor of the Garber plaintiffs in their suit against MLB and
should hold that the League’s broadcasting policies unreasonably
restrain trade. Part I explores the legal precedent and history of MLB’s
antitrust exemption from Federal Baseball, including the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in American Needle. Part II describes how the
various baseball broadcasting agreements for in- and out-of-market
games operate. Part III argues that the Garber plaintiffs should prevail
in their suit against the League because the court should apply American
Needle to MLB and its member clubs, overturn professional baseball’s
antitrust exemption, and hold that the League’s noncompetitive
broadcasting policies unreasonably restrain trade in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. Finally, Part IV proposes steps that the League
can take in future broadcasting procedures, whether or not the Garber
plaintiffs are victorious in their suit, for the mutual benefit of the League
and fans, as well as to maintain the competitive balance among the MLB
clubs.
I. HISTORY OF THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
In order to properly understand the issues being raised in Garber, it
is necessary to first examine the basis for MLB’s antitrust exemption
and its scope under current law. This muddled history can be traced
through two distinct periods: the creation and preservation of the
exemption through its first fifty years from 1922 to 1972, and a
narrowing of the exemption from 1972 to the present through various
lower court decisions and federal legislation. 10
A. 1922–1972: CREATION AND P RESERVATION OF THE
EXEMPTION
In 1922, the Supreme Court created the League’s exemption from
antitrust law in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League
of Professional Base Ball Clubs. 11 Although the first professional

8. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
9. Complaint, Garber v. Office of the Comm’r of MLB, No. 12 Civ. 3704 (S.D.N.Y.
2012), 2012 WL 1609215 [hereinafter Garber Complaint].
10. See Nathaniel Grow, Defining the “Business of Baseball”: A Proposed Framework
for Determining the Scope of Professional Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 44 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 557 (2010).
11. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
208 (1922).
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baseball team, the Cincinnati Red Stockings, played as early as 1869, 12
the League as we know it was not formed until 1903 when the
independent American and National Leagues signed the “National
Agreement” to work together in furtherance of the sport. 13
During these early stages of professional baseball, the American and
National Leagues were challenged by rival independent leagues, which
fought for players, fans, and business. 14 Many of these smaller
independent leagues, the most popular of which was the eight-team
Federal League, were driven out of business by the more renowned
American and National Leagues. 15 In 1915, the American and National
Leagues reached a settlement with the Federal League in which some
Federal League owners would accept a buyout or be allowed to buy
franchises in one of the two major leagues. 16
The publicly owned Baltimore Terrapins (the Baltfeds) opted out of
this settlement, 17 instead initiating the Federal Baseball lawsuit in 1917
against the American and National Leagues. 18 In that case, the plaintiffs
alleged under section 4 of the Clayton Act 19 that the defendants
“conspir[ed] to destroy its franchise by monopolizing the baseball
business and restraining trade therein.” 20 In the brief opinion by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes—writing on behalf of a unanimous Court—the
Supreme Court denied application of federal antitrust law to organized
baseball on the grounds that it did not constitute commerce under the
scope of congressional authority. 21 The Court specifically stated that the

12. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., The Origin of the Baseball Antitrust Exemption: Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 34 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 183, 185 (2009).
13. Id. at 186.
14. Id. at 185.
15. Id. at 186.
16. Id. at 189.
17. Id. As part of the settlement, the Baltfeds were only offered their “equitable
distribution” of the Federal League’s value: a sum of $50,000—a disappointment compared
to the Brooklyn franchise’s owner who received a $400,000 buyout. Id. In fact, transcripts
from the settlement meeting imply that the Baltfeds did not even have a representative
present, in part because
[t]he major leagues did not need to eliminate every franchise in order to hobble their
competitor. Moreover, the Baltimore market did not appeal to organized baseball, which
had already left the market once in 1903. Charles Comiskey, owner of the White Sox,
expressed the view that Baltimore was “a minor league city, and not a hell of a good one
at that.”

Id. (quoting Brief on Behalf of Defendants in Error at 155, Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v.
Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (No. 204)).
18. Id. at 190.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
20. Alito, supra note 12, at 190.
21. Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208–09.
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“business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely state
affairs.” 22 First, the Court reasoned that, because of the nature of
baseball as a sporting event that is “personal effort, not related to
production,” it could not be considered commerce. 23 Second, even if
baseball games did constitute commerce, according to the Court,
transportation of players and equipment across state lines, as well as
attendance of fans from out of state, were “a mere incident.” 24 As stated
more clearly by the Circuit Court, “[n]ot until [the players] come into
contact with their opponents on the baseball field and the contest opens
does the game come into existence. It is local in its beginning and in its
end.” 25
By the time the Supreme Court reviewed baseball’s antitrust
exemption again in Toolson v. New York Yankees 26 thirty-one years
later, the way baseball was presented to the public, as well as
jurisprudence behind Federal Baseball, had changed significantly. 27
Through technological developments in the 1930s and 1940s, baseball
games were now being broadcast across state lines using radio and
television. 28 Furthermore, in the decades following Federal Baseball,
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the scope of congressional power had
expanded drastically—the Court shifted away from the narrow concepts
of interstate commerce in E. C. Knight 29 and Hammer v. Dagenhart 30 to
its more expanded view in United States v. Darby 31 and Wickard v.
Filburn, 32 which rejected the direct/indirect standard of commerce from
Dagenhart. 33
Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 208–09.
Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., 269 F. 681, 685
(D.C. Cir. 1920).
26. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
27. Hylton, supra note 3, at 395.
28. Id.; Kevin McDonald, Antitrust and Baseball: Stealing Holmes, 23 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
89, 90 (1998).
29. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (holding that a sugar
manufacturer did not violate the Sherman Act because manufacturing occurred before the
goods entered the stream of commerce and, therefore, was only incidentally and indirectly
related to commerce).
30. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (holding that a law barring child
labor in factories was invalid because manufacturing has no direct effect on commerce and,
therefore, cannot be regulated by Congress).
31. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118–19 (1941) (holding that some intrastate
activities affect interstate commerce and can be regulated by Congress, overruling
Dagenhart, and abandoning the “stream of commerce” argument).
32. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123–24 (1942) (holding that a farmer growing
extra wheat for personal consumption would have a significant aggregate effect on interstate
commerce and rejecting the direct/indirect test from Dagenhart).
33. See Hylton, supra note 3, at 395 (“[T]he 1922 United States Supreme Court decision
which had held that baseball was not a form of interstate commerce, had been seriously

22.
23.
24.
25.
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Nevertheless, in a one-paragraph, 7-2 opinion, the Supreme Court
found in Toolson that baseball’s antitrust exemption should be upheld. 34
First, the Court cited stare decisis as a ground for upholding the
exemption. 35 Because Congress had not done anything to alter the
decision of the Supreme Court in Federal Baseball, “[t]he business has
thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it
was not subject to antitrust legislation.” 36 The Toolson Court then held
that, because over thirty years had passed since the Court’s decision in
Federal Baseball, and no legislation was passed to remove the judicially
created exemption (even though it was not enumerated in the Sherman
Antitrust Act in the first place), “Congress had no intention of including
the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.” 37
This last section of the opinion is significant because it effectively
changed the core of the Court’s holding in Federal Baseball. 38 Instead of
saying that baseball was not part of interstate commerce, and thus could
not be regulated by Congress, the Toolson Court held that it was never
the intent of Congress to regulate baseball through the Sherman Act at
all. 39 In fact, despite stating that the opinion was based almost
completely on the opinion of Federal Baseball, 40 the Court in 1922 did
not discuss congressional intent at all, prompting one critic to call the
Toolson opinion “the greatest bait-and-switch scheme in the history of
the Supreme Court.” 41
In spite of the Supreme Court’s preservation of the exemption on
completely different grounds, the Court continued to sustain organized
baseball’s antitrust exemption over the next several decades. 42 During
this time, the Court considered four separate cases that discussed and
solidified the antitrust exemption without involving organized baseball
at all. 43 In the 1955 case, United States v. Shubert, the Court considered
an antitrust suit brought against a theater company and held that the
Toolson decision was a “narrow application of the rule of stare
decisis.” 44 However, the Supreme Court did not just refuse to apply
Toolson to non-sporting events. 45 Over the next sixteen years the Court
eroded by the Court’s expanded definition of interstate commerce in the 1930s and 1940s . . .
.”).
34. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Hylton, supra note 3, at 397.
39. Grow, supra note 10, at 570.
40. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
41. Grow, supra note 10, at 570–71.
42. Id. at 571–73.
43. Id.
44. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 230 (1955).
45. Grow, supra note 10, at 571–73.
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refused to extend the exemption to boxing, 46 football, 47 and basketball, 48
and thus continued to hold that it was only baseball that received this
preferred status. In fact, despite stating in Radovich v. NFL that the
Federal Baseball holding “at best was of dubious validity,” and was
“unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical,” 49 the Court maintained its
puzzling position and continued to uphold baseball’s antitrust status. 50
The last time the Supreme Court specifically addressed baseball’s
exemption was in the 1972 case, Flood v. Kuhn. 51 Curt Flood, an all-star
outfielder who earned success while playing for the St. Louis Cardinals
for twelve seasons, was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in 1969
without any type of notice. 52 Disappointed about the trade, he
unsuccessfully appealed to the Commissioner of Baseball, arguing that
he should be allowed to try and strike his own bargain with a major
league team of his choosing as a free agent. 53 Although today the ability
for athletes to form their own contracts with teams as a free agent is
commonplace, at that time baseball operated under the “reserve clause”
system, where players’ rights were kept by the team with which they had
been playing when their original contract expired. 54 As a result, Flood
brought a suit against the League, charging violations of federal antitrust
law, civil rights statutes, and the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of
involuntary servitude. 55
Following Justice Blackmun’s sweeping glorification of baseball in
the opinion’s introduction, 56 the Court fully conceded that
“[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate
commerce.” 57 Nevertheless, the Court stubbornly upheld baseball’s
exemption again by stating:
We continue to be loath, 50 years after Federal Baseball and almost
two decades after Toolson, to overturn those cases judicially when
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

United States v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 244 (1955).
Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 447–48 (1957).
Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205–06 (1971).
Radovich, 352 U.S. at 450, 452.
Id. at 453.
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
Id. at 265.
Id.
See Simon Rottenberg, The Baseball Players’ Labor Market, 64 J. P OL. ECON. 242,
245 (1956).
55. Flood, 407 U.S. at 265–66.
56. Justice Blackmun begins his opinion with a look back at the history of baseball,
including information about the 1869 Cincinnati Red Stockings, who had only one
Cincinnatian on the roster and traveled over 11,000 miles that season. Id. at 260–62. He then
goes on to list over eighty former players, reference works about sports such as Casey at the
Bat, refer to baseball as the “national pastime,” and cite from the lower court’s opinion that
“[t]he game is on higher ground; it behooves every one to keep it there.” Id. at 260–67
(citing Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
57. Id. at 282.
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Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those decisions to stand
for so long and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly
evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively. . . . If there is
any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic
of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this
58
Court.

The crux of Justice Blackmun’s holding was that even though the
precedent from Federal Baseball was an “anomaly” and an “aberration,”
organized baseball had grown and flourished for so many decades
because of its reliance on this antitrust exemption. 59 As a result, the
Court was concerned with retroactivity problems and believed that
Congress would be the best forum to make any adjustments. 60
B. 1972–P RESENT: LOWER COURT LIMITS ON THE SCOPE OF
BASEBALL’S EXEMPTION
Since the ruling came down in 1972, the Court’s decision in Flood
has been highly criticized. 61 As a result, the years following this
decision were marked primarily by a rolling back of the scope of
baseball’s exemption through judicial action and legislation. 62
The most notable area where baseball’s antitrust status began to
decline was in regard to labor. 63 The Flood decision not only raised
awareness to the public about the reserve clause, but also ignited the
players to take action. 64 In 1975, players Andy Messersmith and Dave
McNally argued that, under the reserve clause, they were free to
negotiate their own contracts with other teams because neither of them
had signed a contract during that year. 65 Messersmith and McNally,
supported by the MLB Players’ Association, were able to convince
baseball’s arbitrator, Peter Seitz, that the reserve clause should be
Id. at 283–84.
Id. at 282–83.
Id.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1381
(1988) (“Flood v. Kuhn is an almost comical adherence to the strict rule against overruling
statutory precedents, particularly considering that the Sherman Act has developed essentially
through a common law process.”); David Greenberg, Baseball’s Con Game: How Did
America’s Pastime Get an Antitrust Exemption?, SLATE (July 19, 2002, 10:36 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history_lesson/2002/07/baseballs_con_gam
e.html (“The opinion—for which Blackmun would long be ridiculed—included a juvenile,
rhapsodic ode to the glories of the national pastime, sprinkled with comments about
legendary ballplayers and references to the doggerel poem ‘Casey at the Bat.’”).
62. Grow, supra note 10, at 575–89.
63. Id. at 575–76.
64. Nick Acocella, Flood of Free Agency, ESPN CLASSIC , http://espn.go.com/classic
/biography/s/flood_curt.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
65. Silver Anniversary: Baseball Salaries Have Skyrocketed Since 1975 Ruling, CNN
SPORTS I LLUSTRATED (Dec. 23, 2000, 2:38 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball
/mlb/news/2000/12/22/free_agency_ap/.

58.
59.
60.
61.
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overturned. 66 The decision was upheld by the Eighth Circuit one year
later, effectively ending the reserve clause system and allowing players
to act as free agents when their contracts expired. 67
Over twenty years later, Congress finally took action by passing the
Curt Flood Act of 1998 (the Curt Flood Act) 68—one year after Flood’s
death. 69 Under this law, Congress reacted to Flood v. Kuhn and
designated that, at least in the limited area of labor, baseball was not
immune to antitrust laws. 70 In doing so, Congress declared that
employment of professional players is subject to antitrust law “to the
same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be
subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by persons in any other
professional sports business affecting interstate commerce.” 71 However,
section 3 of the Curt Flood Act specifically limited these changes from
affecting minor league players, the relationship between major and
minor league teams, franchise expansion and relocation, ownership
issues, broadcasting, and the employment of umpires. 72
This act of Congress has been interpreted many ways, with some
seeing it as an endorsement of the Court’s precedent thus far on
antitrust; others deem Congress’s actions as mere indifference. 73 To
make matters more confusing, the Curt Flood Act specifically says that
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed to affect the application to
organized professional baseball of the nonstatutory labor exemption
from the antitrust laws.” 74 During deliberation over the bill in Congress,
Senate co-sponsors Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy stated that the
intention of the Act was “to have no effect other than to clarify the status
of major league players under the antitrust laws. With regard to all other
context or other persons or entities, the law will be the same after
passage of the Act as it is today.” 75 Therefore, the Act largely left the
League’s antitrust exemption intact.

66. Id.
67. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 532 F.2d 615, 632 (8th Cir.
1976). Although the court stated that “we intimate no views on the reserve clause system,” it
deferred to the decision of the arbitrator, which effectively ended the use of the reserve
clause. Id.
68. Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012)).
69. Acocella, supra note 64.
70. Grow, supra note 10, at 575–76.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a).
72. Id.
73. Grow, supra note 10, at 576.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(d)(4).
75. Martin M. Tomlinson, The Commissioner’s New Clothes: The Myth of Major League
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 255, 287 (2008) (quoting 144
CONG. REC. 18,459 (1998) (statements of Sens. Wellstone, Hatch & Leahy)).
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During floor debate on the Curt Flood Act, Senator Paul Wellstone
was concerned that passing the Act would have a chilling effect on
decisions from lower courts, including then-pending litigation in the
Senator’s home state of Minnesota, which held a more limited view of
the antitrust exemption. 76 Indeed, sixteen years before debate on the Curt
Flood Act, a federal district court in Texas considered Henderson
Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n. 77 In that case, a local radio
station that broadcasted baseball games for the Houston Astros sued the
owner of the team. 78 The station contended that, because the team
cancelled their broadcasting contract and gave exclusive broadcasting
rights to a competing station, it had violated the Sherman Act and state
antitrust law. 79 The franchise’s owner moved to dismiss the case on the
basis of the antitrust exemption laid out in the Federal Baseball
trilogy. 80 The court denied the dismissal and instead relied on the narrow
“unique characteristics and needs” standard that the Supreme Court
articulated in Flood. 81 The court went on to say:
The fact that interstate broadcasting has on the one hand subjected
other professional sports to the antitrust laws, but has not on the other
hand affected the baseball exemption, is perplexing . . . . Radio
broadcasting is not a part of the sport in the way in which players,
82
umpires, the league structure and the reserve system are.

Ten years later, the Southern District of New York also interpreted
the Supreme Court precedent in Flood as limiting the scope of the
antitrust exemption solely to baseball’s “unique characteristics and
needs.” 83 However, lower courts have disagreed as to what aspects of
baseball were included in this standard. 84
Notably, in 1993, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered
the case Piazza v. MLB. 85 Here, the League thwarted two Pennsylvania
businessmen, as part of a larger partnership, in their attempt to buy the
San Francisco Giants franchise for $115 million and relocate the team to
a stadium in St. Petersburg, Florida. 86 The League did not approve the

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

144 CONG. REC . 18,459 (1998).
Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Hous. Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
Id. at 264–65.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 268–69.
Id.
Postema v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1488–89
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972)); see also Grow, supra note 10, at 589–91 (describing the Postema
decision as only applying the exemption to the League structure and reserve system).
84. Grow, supra note 10, at 589–91.
85. Piazza v. MLB, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
86. Id. at 422–23.
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sale, claiming that there were concerns about the financial backgrounds
of the businessmen, and sold the team instead for $100 million to
another investor who agreed to keep the team in San Francisco. 87 Among
the many claims brought by the plaintiffs was a claim of violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act based on the League’s “direct and indirect
restraints on the purchase, sale, transfer, relocation of, and competition
for such teams.” 88 The League moved to dismiss the suit because of their
antitrust exemption under Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood. 89 The
court, however, denied the League’s motion on the grounds that the
Supreme Court precedent on baseball’s antitrust exemption was limited
to cases that dealt with the reserve clause. 90
The Piazza court was not alone in holding that the exemption was
limited to the reserve clause. 91 Over the next two years, Florida state
courts reached similar decisions on the same issue discussed in Piazza
regarding the relocation of a franchise to Tampa Bay. 92 In the 1994 case
Butterworth v. National League, the Florida Supreme Court not only
reached the same decision but was extremely clear in doing so, stating
specifically, “[W]e find that baseball’s antitrust exemption extends only
to the reserve system.” 93 One year later, in Morsani v. MLB, plaintiffs
filed an antitrust suit against the League for again thwarting their plans
to have a baseball franchise in Tampa Bay. 94 Here, the court upheld the
Butterworth decision and also ruled that the antitrust exemption was
limited to the reserve clause. 95
What is clear, however, is that, consistent with the standard
articulated in Henderson Broadcasting, federal courts have not applied
the baseball exemption to cases involving baseball entities and licensing
with third parties. In 1972, the Northern District of California applied
federal antitrust law to assess a contract between the Oakland Athletics
and a concessions company. 96 In 1981, about one year before Henderson
Broadcasting, the Third Circuit applied antitrust law to a suit regarding
87. Id. The League expressed concerns about “out-of-state money” and that the
“‘Pennsylvania People’ had ‘dropped out.’” Id. at 422. The two plaintiffs, Vincent Piazza
and Vincent Tirendi, were the only investors from Pennsylvania, and they believed that the
League’s comments, along with the fact that they were both of Italian descent, gave the
implication that they had some association with organized crime. Id. at 422–23.
88. Id. at 424.
89. Id. at 433.
90. Id. at 438; cf. Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 537 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
91. Grow, supra note 10, at 585–89.
92. Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 1022 (Fla.
1994).
93. Id. at 1022.
94. Morsani v. MLB, 663 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
95. Id. at 655.
96. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 365 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Cal.
1972), rev’d on other grounds, 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975).

168

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 8

licensing agreements between the players’ union and a baseball card
manufacturer. 97 Three years later, the Eastern District of New York
applied antitrust law to evaluate a broadcast licensing contract between
Cablevision and the two New York professional baseball teams (as well
as other New York professional sports teams), eventually dismissing the
claims because the plaintiff (a competing cable company) failed to show
injury as a result of these agreements. 98 In a more recent decision, the
Second Circuit evaluated the case MLB Properties v. Salvino, where a
stuffed animal manufacturer brought an antitrust suit against the League
in response to a cease-and-desist letter for the unlicensed use of MLB
Club logos. 99 The League did not even raise the antitrust exemption as a
defense, instead moving for judgment on the merits to avoid having the
exemption reviewed in court and running the risk of losing it
altogether. 100
In contrast, federal courts have readily applied the antitrust
exemption in cases that fall more squarely within the “business of
baseball,” such as those involving league structure and relocation of
franchises. In 1974, citing Flood, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower
court’s dismissal of an antitrust claim against the League by the owner
of a minor league team in Portland who wanted compensation for the
League’s expansion into the team’s exclusive territory. 101 In 1982, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the League’s player assignment and franchise
location system “plainly concerns matters that are an integral part of the
business of baseball” and upheld the exemption. 102 Two subsequent
federal court decisions regarding franchise relocation, New Orleans
Pelicans Baseball v. National Ass’n of Professional Baseball Leagues
and MLB v. Crist, also upheld the exemption on the same grounds. 103
Most recently, in City of San José v. Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball, an antitrust claim was brought against the League for rejecting
relocation of the Oakland Athletics to San José, California. 104 Although
97. Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1009 (1982).
98. Nishimura v. Dolan, 599 F. Supp. 484, 488–91, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
99. MLB Props. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 294–95 (2d Cir. 2008).
100. Michael J. Mozes & Ben Glicksman, Adjusting the Stream? Analyzing Major League
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption After American Needle, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 265,
283 (2011).
101. Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1974).
102. Prof’l Baseball Sch. & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085, 1086 (11th Cir. 1982).
103. MLB v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1189 (11th Cir. 2003); New Orleans Pelicans Baseball,
Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc., No. 93-253, 1994 WL 631144, at *9
(E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1994); cf. Piazza v. MLB, 831 F. Supp. 420, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
104. See Order Granting-in-Part and Denying-in-Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Complaint Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), City of San José v.
Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-02787, 2013 WL 5609346, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 11, 2013) [hereinafter San José Order]; Andrew Longstreth, Baseball’s Antitrust
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Judge Whyte admitted that “[t]he exemption is an ‘aberration’ that
makes little sense given the heavily interstate nature of the ‘business of
baseball’ today,” he still dismissed the antitrust claim, holding that
“[t]he alleged interference with a baseball club’s relocation efforts
presents an issue of league structure that is ‘integral’ to the business of
baseball, and thus falls squarely within the exemption.” 105 The court’s
decision in Piazza, the only franchise location case in which the
exemption was not upheld, was explicitly rejected in both the New
Orleans Pelicans and San José decisions. 106
C. 2010: AMERICAN NEEDLE V. NFL
In 2010, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in American
Needle v. NFL that could put baseball’s unique antitrust position in
jeopardy. 107 The dispute arose when National Football League Properties
(NFLP)—the organization formed by teams in the National Football
League (NFL) to market and license their intellectual property and
merchandise—granted an exclusive ten-year license to Reebok to
“manufacture and sell trademarked headwear for all 32 teams.” 108
American Needle, a headwear manufacturer, designer, and dealer, 109
enjoyed the benefit of a non-exclusive license with the NFL until
2000. 110 That year, the company filed a suit against the NFL, its member
teams, NFLP, and Reebok for violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act 111 because the license to Reebok effectively shut down this portion
of their business. 112

Exemption Lives On in San Jose, REUTERS LEGAL (Oct. 15, 2013), available at
http://t.co/GZ1NEQTMhC (Westlaw).
105. San José Order, supra note 104, at *10–11 (citing Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282
(1972); Prof’l Baseball Sch. & Clubs, Inc., 693 F.2d at 1086); see Bob Egelko, Judge’s
Ruling on A’s a Win and Loss for San Jose, SFGATE (Oct. 11, 2013, 8:00 PM),
http://www.sfgate.com/athletics/article/Judge-s-ruling-on-A-s-a-win-and-loss-for-San-Jose4888296.php.
106. New Orleans Pelicans, 1994 WL 631144, at *8–9 (“This Court cannot accept the
cramped view of Flood that Piazza takes.”); San José Order, supra note 104, at *10 (“The
court disagrees with the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s opinion in Piazza that Federal
Baseball, Toolson and Flood can be limited to the reserve clause because the reserve clause
is never referenced in any of those cases as part of the Court’s holdings.”).
107. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).
108. Id. at 187.
109. About, AM. NEEDLE, http://shop.americanneedle.com/pages/about (last visited Nov.
17, 2013).
110. Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp. 2d 941, 942 (N.D. Ill.
2007).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
112. Am. Needle, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 942.

170

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 8

In defending its actions, the NFL relied on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. 113 and argued
that because the thirty-two individual NFL teams acted as a single entity
for the same common interests of the whole league, they were therefore
unable to violate antitrust laws. 114 The basis of this argument arose from
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent from a denial of certiorari in the case North
American Soccer League v. NFL, arguing that sports leagues do not
compete with themselves and instead compete with “other forms of
entertainment.” 115 This framework was picked up by the Seventh Circuit
decision, Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, holding
that sports leagues operate as a single entity because of the need to
cooperate in the competition and scheduling of games. 116
After the lower courts accepted this argument, 117 American Needle
appealed the case to the Supreme Court, sought a reversal of the lower
courts’ decisions, and petitioned the Court to hold that antitrust law
applies to all concerted actions of the NFL’s teams rather than just
licensing agreements. 118 The respondents—as well as the National
Basketball Association (NBA) and National Hockey League (NHL)—
welcomed this petition, since prevailing in the suit would have allowed
the NFL to act as a single entity and be exempt from antitrust laws in all
of its actions. 119
In the end, American Needle succeeded in their suit, but the
Supreme Court’s unanimous decision did not broaden its holding in
accordance with the requests of the parties in their respective appeals. 120
First, the Court rejected the NFL’s single entity argument from
Copperweld Corp. and held that
[t]he NFL teams do not possess either the unitary decisionmaking
quality or the single aggregation of economic power characteristic of
independent action. Each of the teams is a substantial, independently
owned, and independently managed business . . . . The teams compete
with one another, not only on the playing field, but to attract fans, for

113. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding that a
parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring, even though
they are separately incorporated, because they act as a single entity).
114. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 194–96 (2010).
115. NFL v. N. Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1077 (1982).
116. Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 597–600 (7th Cir. 1996).
117. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 743–44 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Simply put, nothing
in § 1 prohibits the NFL teams from cooperating so the league can compete against other
entertainment providers.”).
118. Brief for Petitioner at 16, Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010) (No. 08661), 2009 WL 3004479, at *16–17.
119. Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 100, at 286.
120. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 195–204.

2013]

Blackout or Blackmail?

171

gate receipts and for contracts with managerial and playing
121
personnel.

Second, the Court rejected the argument that there was no antitrust
violation because the teams granted the exclusive license under the
legally separate entity of NFLP, opining that an organization cannot
evade antitrust law by simply operating under a different name. 122 The
third argument put forth by the NFL stated that it operated as a joint
venture, since no team could fully operate without cooperation with the
other teams in the league. 123 The Court quickly dispatched this argument
because although “participation of others is necessary” in a joint
venture, parties’ actions can still violate section 1 of the Sherman Act
when their interests in a joint venture differ from the interests of the firm
as a whole. 124
The limitations in the Supreme Court’s opinion—in opposition to
the broad arguments put forth by the parties—are particularly relevant in
this third point. The Court held that the exclusive licensing of
intellectual property at issue in this case constituted illegal concerted
activity under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 125 However, it also
conceded parts of the NFL’s argument that, in order for it to be
economically successful, teams need to cooperate without being
“trapped by antitrust law.” 126 The Court went on to say that “the interest
in maintaining a competitive balance among athletic teams is legitimate
and important,” 127 and as such it is necessary to have cooperation
between teams in some areas—including production and scheduling of
games—in order for the NFL to operate effectively. 128 Although this
may suggest that sports leagues and teams can engage in some collective
decisions in order for the league as a whole to be successful and
profitable, the Court did not indicate, other than the two limited areas of
production and scheduling of games that were specifically mentioned, 129
where sports leagues and teams could cooperate without regard to
antitrust laws.

Id. at 196–97.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 199–202.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 204 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984)).
128. Id. at 202.
129. Id.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

172

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 8

II. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S BROADCASTING POLICIES
The current broadcasting procedures of the League are as intricate
and confusing as they are archaic. 130 To fully understand the issue at the
heart of Garber, it is also necessary to break down MLB’s different
broadcasting concepts regarding team territorial rights, in-market games,
out-of-market games, and blackout agreements.
A. TEAM TERRITORIAL RIGHTS
The anticompetitive broadcasting policies alleged by the plaintiffs in
Garber are manifested through both cable and Internet broadcasts by
using the League’s “demarcated territories.” 131 The League developed
these territorial-rights rules over forty years ago in order to protect a
team’s marketing area, and they were based on the purported local fan
base for each MLB team. 132 For example, most of New England is
currently listed in the Boston Red Sox market, and much of the Pacific
Northwest is part of the Seattle Mariners market. 133
Each of these territories is used to determine what games are
designated as “in-market” or “out-of-market” broadcasts based on what
team is playing and where the consumer is located. 134 A fan who lives in
Seattle and is trying to watch the Mariners—regardless of whether they
were actually playing in Seattle or in some other city—would be inmarket. 135 However that same fan would be out-of-market if he tried to
watch the San Francisco Giants play the Los Angeles Dodgers. 136
Although some territories are only claimed by one MLB team, there is a
great deal of overlap—some territories have up to six teams that are inmarket. 137 Both in-market and out-of-market games, as well as the fans
who watch them, are affected by the anticompetitive broadcasting
practices that MLB employs. 138 Therefore, the plaintiffs in Garber
address both types of baseball broadcasts in their complaint. 139

Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7.
Id.
Passan, Selig’s Promise, supra note 2.
Map of Major League Baseball’s Broadcasting Markets, http://sports.yahoo.com/news
/mlb%E2%80%99s-blackout-problem-keeps-sport-in-dark-ages.html (last visited Nov. 17,
2013) [hereinafter Blackout Map] (follow “in demarcated territories” hyperlink).
134. Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7.
135. Blackout Map, supra note 133; Blackouts FAQ, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb
/help/faq_blackout.jsp (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7.
139. Garber Complaint, supra note 9, at 23–34.

130.
131.
132.
133.
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B. IN-MARKET BROADCASTING
First, the Garber complaint discusses the anticompetitive exclusive
license agreements for in-market broadcasts. 140 For most in-market
games, MLB teams enter into exclusive broadcasting agreements with
Regional Sports Networks (RSNs) such as Comcast Sportsnet Chicago,
which broadcasts White Sox and Cubs games, or Yankees Entertainment
and Sports (YES) Networks, which broadcasts Yankees games. 141 These
exclusive agreements are meant to “divide the market geographically,
permitting only the video presentations of a local team’s television
partner to be shown in that team’s ‘exclusive territory.’” 142 In doing so,
these RSNs have the exclusive right to broadcast games in their
designated territory and do not have to be concerned with other
broadcasting networks encroaching on their target audience. 143 As a
result, consumers who are in-market do not have access to games
broadcast by the RSN of another territory and need to purchase out-ofmarket packages in order to watch these games. 144
C. OUT-OF-MARKET BROADCASTING
The second aspect of the League’s noncompetitive policies that are
alleged by the Garber plaintiffs surrounds the broadcasting of out-ofmarket live baseball games. 145 As discussed above, the RSNs carry only
the local teams that are included within their territorial areas and agree
with other sports networks not to broadcast games of other teams. 146
Therefore, consumers who are out-of-market and wish to watch their
favorite teams—with a few exceptions—are required to purchase
specific “out-of-market packages.” 147
Currently, there are only two such packages available, both of which
are controlled by the League. 148 The first offers a paid subscription to
MLB.tv that is streamed on the Internet and provided directly from the
League. 149 For the 2013 season, a subscription to the MLB.tv Premium
package cost $129.99 for the year, while the basic MLB.tv package cost
Id. at 23.
Id. at 15, 24.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 63. Each team has a designated RSN as their television partner, and this partner
has an exclusive monopoly over one team’s games in that territory, except for the cities that
have two different teams. Id. Only one out of these four two-team cities—New York City—
has two independent RSNs that broadcast baseball games. Id.
144. Id. at 27.
145. Id. at 27–31.
146. Id. at 15, 24.
147. Id. at 27. Consumers do not need to purchase out-of-market packages for nationally
broadcasted games. See Blackouts FAQ, supra note 135.
148. Garber Complaint, supra note 9, at 27.
149. Id.

140.
141.
142.
143.
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$109.99 yearly. 150 However, the League requires customers to purchase
a premium MLB.tv subscription, instead of the basic package, in order
to watch live games on mobile devices. 151 The second option is the MLB
Extra Innings package, a premium television subscription offered only
through cable and satellite distributors. 152 In 2013, DirectTV offered the
MLB Extra Innings package for a fee of $139.96 per half season,
amounting to $279.92 for the full season. 153
Yet, despite advertisements that claim out-of-market packages offer
“every game . . . everywhere,” 154 or “your season ticket to every MLB
game,” 155 these subscriptions are subject to blackout restrictions that
prevent customers from watching certain games. 156 The blackout
agreements take two different forms: national and territorial
blackouts. 157 National blackouts prevent MLB.tv and MLB Extra Innings
customers from watching games where the League has licensed
exclusive broadcasting rights to national networks, such as the
Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN) and Fox. 158
National broadcasting blackouts occur for any Saturday game starting
within three hours before or after a nationally broadcasted game on Fox,
any Sunday games beginning after 5:00 PM EST, as well as any other
games broadcast on national networks, such as the All-Star Game and
postseason games. 159 However, an Internet subscription for postseason
games (with the exception of the World Series and National League
Championship Series) is available from the League’s postseason.tv

150. Mark Newman, MLB.TV Opens 11th Season of Live Baseball, MLB.COM (Feb. 5,
2013,
9:23
AM),
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20130204&content_id
=41394212&vkey=news_mlb&c_id=mlb [hereinafter Newman, MLB.TV].
151. Mobile FAQ, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/help/faq_alerts.jsp?c_id=mlb# (last
visited Nov. 17, 2013) (“If you purchased MLB.TV at MLB.com and you cannot access At
Bat Premium features when accessing Subscriber Login with your MLB.com credentials, you
likely purchased MLB.TV Basic, which does not include At Bat Premium access.”).
152. Garber Complaint, supra note 9, at 27.
153. What’s Included in the 2013 MLB Extra Innings Package?, DIRECTV,
https://support.directv.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/29/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013)
[hereinafter 2013 MLB Extra Innings Package].
154. MLB at Bat, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mobile/atbat/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2013).
155. MLB Extra Innings, DIRECTV, http://www.directv.com/sports/mlb (last visited Nov.
17, 2013).
156. Blackouts FAQ, supra note 135.
157. Id.
158. Id.; Why Are Some Saturday and Sunday Games Blacked Out of MLB Extra Innings?,
DIRECTV, https://support.directv.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/36/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2013); How Do Blackouts Work?, DIRECTV, https://support.directv.com/app/answers/detail
/a_id/1702/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
159. Blackouts FAQ, supra note 135.
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package for a fee of $4.99 for customers in the United States and Canada
and $24.99 for all other customers. 160
Territorial blackouts are more common and are based on the
territorial rights restrictions for RSNs. 161 For these types of restrictions,
“live games will be blacked out in each applicable Club’s home
television territory, regardless of whether that Club is playing at home or
away.” 162 This means that, using the same hypothetical fan from Seattle,
he or she could watch any televised baseball game, so long as the Seattle
Mariners are not one of the teams playing, regardless of where the game
is held. 163 For these games, fans have to subscribe to in-market packages
through their local cable provider to watch the game on the local
RSNs. 164
III. THE CASE FOR GARBER V. MLB
Against this backdrop of baseball’s antitrust exemption and the
League’s complex broadcasting policies, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York will consider Garber v. MLB. 165 The
complaint was filed as a class action by two different classes of
plaintiffs, both of which were allegedly charged supra-competitive
prices and encountered unreasonable blackout restrictions because of
baseball’s antitrust exemption: (1) a television class for those who
purchased a cable package through Comcast, DirectTV, or their
subsidiaries in order to watch live baseball games within the past four
years and (2) an Internet class who purchased a subscription to watch
live games through MLB.tv within the past four years. 166
The four plaintiffs in the case who represent these two different
classes brought antitrust actions for anticompetitive broadcasting
practices under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act against the
Commissioner of Baseball, the League itself, nine of the thirty
individual baseball teams, 167 and several broadcasting companies,
160. Mark Newman, With Postseason.TV, Fans Get All the Angles, MLB.COM (Oct. 3,
2012,
11:53
PM),
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20121003&content_id
=39452986&vkey=news_mlb&c_id=mlb.
161. Maury Brown, The Ledger Domain: Blackout Blues, B ASEBALL P ROSPECTUS (July
24, 2006), http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=5335.
162. Blackouts FAQ, supra note 135.
163. See Blackout Map, supra note 133.
164. Brown, supra note 161.
165. Garber Complaint, supra note 9; Laumann v. NHL, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 471
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (The Garber case has been consolidated with a similar class-action antitrust
lawsuit against the NHL involving many of the same plaintiffs.).
166. Garber Complaint, supra note 9, at 18–19.
167. Id. at 13–14. Of the thirty MLB teams, the Garber complaint only lists the following
nine teams as defendants: Oakland Athletics, Seattle Mariners, Chicago Cubs, Chicago
White Sox, Colorado Rockies, New York Yankees, Philadelphia Phillies, Pittsburgh Pirates,
and San Francisco Giants. Id. at 10–11.
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including Comcast, DirectTV, Fox Sports Net, Turner Broadcast System
(TBS), and ESPN. 168 The Sherman Act makes unlawful “[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations.” 169 The Garber complaint alleges that the broadcasting
agreements of the League are in violation of the Act because of the
League’s anticompetitive agreements, blackout policies, and supracompetitive prices. 170 In pursuing this action, the plaintiffs hope to
receive damages and injunctive relief in order to reclaim the excessive
costs of purchasing cable and Internet broadcasting packages, as well as
prevent the defendants from furthering any anticompetitive broadcasting
policies. 171
On December 5, 2012, U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin rejected
the League’s motion to dismiss against the Garber plaintiffs, stating that
the plaintiffs have “plausibly alleged” that they have been harmed by the
League’s anticompetitive broadcasting policies. 172 In the opinion, Judge
Scheindlin held that “[m]aking all games available as part of a package,
while it may increase output overall, does not, as a matter of law,
eliminate the harm to competition wrought by preventing the individual
teams from competing to sell their games outside their home territories
in the first place.” 173
The Southern District of New York should ultimately rule in favor
of the plaintiffs in deciding this case for two reasons. First, after the
Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle, baseball’s antitrust
exemption should no longer apply or should be narrowed such that it
does not include broadcasting of professional baseball games. 174 Second,
the League’s broadcasting procedures unreasonably restrain trade in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 175 As a result of these
anticompetitive actions, consumers and fans of baseball pay supracompetitive prices for cable and Internet subscriptions, undergo unfair
blackout policies, and subscribe to excessive amounts of broadcasts in
order to watch their favorite in-market and out-of-market teams.
Accordingly, the League should discontinue anticompetitive

Id. at 13–17.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
Garber Complaint, supra note 9, at 2.
Id. at 40–41.
Laumann v. NHL, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 491–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (The court rejected
the plaintiffs’ section 2 claim against the RSN and Multichannel Video Programming
Distributor (MVPD) defendants for failure to allege any monopoly power on the part of these
defendants, but the section 2 claims against the NHL and MLB were not dismissed.).
173. Id.
174. Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 100, at 288–95.
175. Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable
Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 465–68 (1990).

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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broadcasting policies and allow fans to subscribe to more targeted
viewing packages for the mutual benefit of fans and MLB.
A. REMOVAL OF BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION AFTER

AMERICAN NEEDLE
The Supreme Court’s rejection of the NFL’s single entity defense in
American Needle has put the antitrust exemption of professional
baseball in jeopardy and is likely one reason why, “according to a
number of sources, the league is taking [the Garber case] very
seriously.” 176 The antitrust exemption from Federal Baseball was twice
upheld by the Supreme Court on the basis of stare decisis. 177 Although
the Court’s decision in American Needle did not involve baseball, its
holding does prevent future courts from simply hanging their hat on
stare decisis when reviewing challenges to the League’s antitrust
exemption. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s holding that baseball did
not constitute interstate commerce, which created the exemption in the
first place, is no longer true—it can be argued it never was—as the
Court admitted in Flood. 178
This is not to say that the League should be prevented from engaging
in anticompetitive measures entirely. Indeed, the Court conceded in
American Needle that sports leagues are allowed some degree of
cooperation with one another in order to schedule and hold games. 179
However, in terms of licensing, a court presumably would not be so
lenient. In fact, the League likely assumed this would be the case when
it refused to raise the exemption as a defense in the Salvino case. 180 Any
licensing case reviewing the exemption following American Needle
would almost certainly pose an even greater risk to the exemption’s
removal. As Judge Scheindlin noted in her opinion rejecting the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, “[t]he fact that the NHL and MLB are
lawful joint ventures does not preclude plaintiffs from challenging the
Leagues’ particular policies under the rule of reason . . . . American
Needle conclusively established that these kinds of arrangements are
subject to Section 1 scrutiny.” 181 Thus, the methodology in American
176. Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7.
177. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356, 357.
178. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
179. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 202 (2010).
180. MLB Props. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008); Mozes & Glicksman, supra
note 100, at 283.
181. Laumann v. NHL, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 485–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) The court further
stated that “the notion that the exhibition of [ ] league games on television and the Internet is
clearly a league issue is contrary to longstanding precedent that agreements limiting the
telecasting of professional sports games are subject to antitrust scrutiny, and analyzed under
the rule of reason.” Id. at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Needle for applying antitrust law to licensing of merchandise serves as a
strong precedent to eliminate baseball’s antitrust exemption by applying
the Sherman Act to the licensing of baseball broadcasts as well.
B. NON-COMPETITIVE BROADCASTING AGREEMENTS AND
BLACKOUT P OLICIES
Without professional baseball’s long-standing shield from federal
antitrust law, the Southern District of New York should agree with the
plaintiffs in Garber and find that the League’s various broadcasting
agreements unreasonably restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
The complaint in Garber first examines the exclusive broadcasting
agreements between the League’s member clubs and local RSNs for inmarket live game broadcasts. 182 These exclusive broadcasting contracts
bring in billions of dollars of revenue for MLB teams, 183 and they are
now worth more to these teams than any other source of revenue,
including ticket sales, merchandising, and sponsorships. 184
For the RSNs, broadcasting agreements are especially valuable
because sports are arguably “DVR-proof.” 185 In today’s world, many
people record live TV and fast-forward through the commercials or
watch prerecorded streaming video online. 186 However, live sporting
events are one of the last television programs to be considered “DVRproof” because audiences still feel the need to watch the events as they

182. Garber Complaint, supra note 9, at 23–27.
183. See Joe Flint & Meg James, Rising Sports Programming Costs Could Have

Consumers Crying Foul, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com
/print/2012/dec/01/business/la-fi-1202-ct-sports-cost-20121202 (stating that L.A. Dodgers
TV rights deal is worth more than $6 billion and nearly half of the average household’s cost
for cable or satellite TV is due to the high cost of sports programming); Jeff Passan, Lawsuit
Targeting MLB’s Blackout Policy to Proceed, YAHOO ! SPORTS (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/lawsuit-targeting-mlb-s-blackout-policy-allowed-to-proceed015544096.html (“Baseball’s infusion of local-television money has transformed the
industry into a richer-than-ever financial behemoth. Multi-billion-dollar deals, including the
Los Angeles Dodgers’ expected $6 billion windfall for 25 years of broadcasts, are the
product of a system that awards territories to teams and allows them a local programming
monopoly.”); Richard Sandomir, Sweet TV Deal Will Taste Bitter to Fans, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/sports/baseball/dodgers-sweet-tv-deal-willtaste-bitter-to-fans.html (describing broadcasting deal between the Los Angeles Dodgers and
Time Warner Cable’s new RSN, SportsNet LA, worth up to $8 billion over twenty-five years
starting in 2014, and how this deal will “add up to $5 a month to the costs of cable, satellite
and telephone companies”); Bill Shaikin & Kevin Baxter, Albert Pujols, C.J. Wilson Deals
Enabled by TV Revenue, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/08
/sports/la-sp-angels-fox-tv-20111209 (discussing exclusive broadcasting contract between
Los Angeles Angels and Fox Sports worth at least $3 billion over twenty years).
184. Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7.
185. Id.
186. Dylan Stableford, The Super Bowl: The Most DVR’d, and DVR-Proof, Broadcast on
TV, YAHOO ! NEWS (Feb. 3, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/cutline/super-bowl-mostdvr-d-dvr-proof-broadcast-200015178.html.
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happen. 187 As stated by John Skipper, programming chief at ESPN, “It’s
exclusive, one of a kind, and it works for us on every level.” 188
Therefore, live sporting events are much less affected by technological
innovations that allow viewers to avoid watching commercials, and
television networks can charge higher prices to advertisers. 189
Additionally, these high profits are not limited to just the MLB teams
and local RSNs, since some games are also broadcast through national
agreements between the League and national broadcasters, including
ESPN, Fox, and TBS. 190 MLB teams and the League are making
millions and billions of dollars in revenue from the RSNs and national
networks, which in turn are earning huge profits from advertising
revenues—and these contracts continue to skyrocket. 191 At the MIT
Sloan Sports Analytics Conference held in 2012, a panel of sports
programming chiefs from ESPN, Fox, and NBC, as well as league media
heads from the NFL and MLB, all agreed that “sports media rights are
rich and getting richer” and “despite some occasional haggling over
game packages . . . , things are working for everyone.” 192
So in the end, everyone benefits—except for the fans. While the
revenues of the League and the broadcasting networks continue to
increase, all of the rising costs are passed directly to the fans, who pay
higher prices on their bills when subscribing to cable providers. 193 In

187. Id.; Mark Reynolds, Major League Baseball Has a Major Problem with Antitrust
Lawsuit, B LEACHER REP. (Mar. 9, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1559827-majorleague-baseball-has-a-major-problem-with-antitrust-lawsuit (“Live sports are basically
DVR-proof television because games are obviously more entertaining to watch for the fans
when the result is unknown.”).
188. Tom Van Riper, Sports Media Rights Keep Rolling—For Now, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2012,
1:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvanriper/2012/03/02/sports-media-rights-keeprolling-for-now/.
189. Stableford, supra note 186 (“Live sports is the most DVR-proof programming out
there . . . , which is why advertisers pay $100,000 a second to advertise there.”).
190. The League and national networks Fox and TBS have a deal in place through 2021 to
broadcast a few national baseball games, including the World Series, various playoff games,
and the All-Star Game, for a combined $800 million annually. The League also has a new
deal with ESPN to broadcast some games from 2014–2021 that would increase their annual
payment from the current rate of $360 million per year to a new rate of $700 million per
year. Garber Complaint, supra note 9, at 24; MLB Completes 8-Year Deal with Fox, Turner
Sports, ASSOCIATED P RESS (Oct. 2, 2012, 1:45 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/mlbcompletes-8-year-deal-fox-turner-sports.
191. The TV rights deal between ESPN and the NFL for ESPN to broadcast Monday Night
Football games went up over seventy percent from their previous agreement. Van Riper,
supra note 188.
192. Id.
193. Id. (“[C]onsumers, ultimately the ones paying for sports programming, may be
nearing their limits. When a network wins a bidding war for a sports property, they recoup
that money through subscription fees from cable and satellite carriers. The carriers, in turn,
try to pass those costs on to customers through higher rates.”); see also Brian Stelter & Amy
Chozick, Paying a ‘Sports Tax,’ Even If You Don’t Watch, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2011),
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fact, some commentators believe that “American television subscribers
pay, on average, about $100 a year for sports programming—no matter
how many games they watch.” 194 Other media analysts have explained
that sports programming only makes up about twenty percent of the
television viewing for an average household, but it represents about fifty
percent of the costs for cable or satellite television subscriptions. 195
Unfairly high subscription fees resulting from restraining trade are
not limited to just in-market packages, as the League can “exploit their
illegal monopoly by charging supra-competitive prices” for the out-ofmarket Internet and premium cable packages as well. 196 Due to the
League’s exemption from antitrust laws and “the clubs’ horizontal
elimination of competition,” the same anticompetitive pricing that fans
are subjected to for in-market baseball broadcasts through subscriptions
to local cable providers also apply to how the League can set prices for
the Internet and premium cable packages for out-of-market
broadcasts. 197 In just the short period of time since the filing of the
Garber lawsuit, the yearly price of the out-of-market packages has
increased by ten percent or more. 198 Furthermore, both the MLB.tv and
MLB Extra Innings packages are offered on an “all-or-nothing” basis,
meaning that “[p]urchasers of MLB.TV must buy all out-of-market
games for all teams even if they are only interested in watching the
games of a particular team.” 199 And because both MLB.tv and MLB
Extra Innings are licensed directly from the League, subscription fees
paid by customers are funneled directly into the coffers of the League
and its thirty teams. 200
Yet, “[a]t the core of Defendants’ restraint of competition in the
video programming market are the regional blackout agreements.” 201
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/business/media/for-pay-tv-clients-a-steady-diet-ofsports.html; Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7; Sandomir, supra note 183.
194. Stelter & Chozick, supra note 193; see also Reynolds, supra note 187 (“Major
League Baseball (MLB) and other sports leagues are charging cable companies and networks
more for the rights to broadcast their games on television, and those costs are being passed
on to consumers—even those who don’t watch sports.”).
195. Van Riper, supra note 188.
196. Garber Complaint, supra note 9, at 6.
197. Id. at 6, 29.
198. Compare id. at 28, 30 (describing the price of the 2011 season of MLB.tv as $99.99
for the basic MLB.tv, $119.99 for MLB.tv Premium, and approximately $200 for the 2011
season of MLB Extra Innings), with 2013 MLB Extra Innings Package, supra note 153, and
Newman, MLB.TV, supra note 150 (showing 2013 prices of $109.99 and $129.99 for MLB.tv
and $139.96 per half season of MLB Extra Innings).
199. Garber Complaint, supra note 9, at 28.
200. Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7 (describing how “every dollar that goes
through MLBAM [Major League Baseball Advanced Media], the league’s digital arm that
runs MLB.tv, is distributed evenly among the 30 teams”); Barry M. Bloom, Senate Holds
Hearing on TV Deal, MLB.COM (Mar. 27, 2007, 4:52 PM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article
.jsp?ymd=20070327&content_id=1861562&vkey=news_mlb&c_id=mlb&fext=.jsp.
201. Garber Complaint, supra note 9, at 24.
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This is because in many situations, fans who attempt to watch live
baseball broadcasts are unable to avoid paying for the supra-competitive
local television subscriptions due to the League’s blackout
restrictions. 202 Because the MLB teams and the League are able to enter
into exclusive contracts with local and national television networks
based on territorial broadcasting rights, fans who wish to watch live
games are often required to purchase cable subscriptions at the supracompetitive prices and purchase out-of-market sports packages, rather
than having access to games directly from the teams. 203
The problem with these blackout policies is twofold. Baseball fans
who want to watch both in-market and out-of-market games are forced
to purchase both out-of-market packages and local cable subscriptions in
order to watch these games. 204 As a result, fans that are already paying
upwards of $109 for out-of-market packages from the League are now
required to also purchase cable subscriptions at their supra-competitive
rates in order to watch in-market games. 205 As troubling as this doubledipping by the League may be for fans, the situation is even direr for
baseball fans in other market areas. In those areas where a fan is
technically within a team’s broadcasting territory but their local RSN
does not subscribe to that team’s games, even buying the in-market
package would not give access to that team’s games. 206 For example, the
territory-rights of much of central and western North Carolina have the
Cincinnati Reds listed as one of their in-market teams. 207 However, not
only do cable companies in North Carolina have no incentive to carry
Fox Sports Ohio (the Reds’ RSN), but that area is already covered by
Fox Sports Carolinas, which does not broadcast Reds games. 208 Thus, a
Reds fan living in Charlotte would have no possible way of watching
live games without making the over seven-hour, 477-mile trip to the
Great American Ball Park in Cincinnati. 209 Additionally, nationally
televised games—some weekend games, the All-Star Game, and all of
the playoffs—are also blacked out for MLB.tv or MLB Extra Innings
subscribers. 210

Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7.
Garber Complaint, supra note 9, at 24–27.
Id.
Garber Complaint, supra note 9, at 24–27; Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7.
Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7.
Blackout Map, supra note 133.
Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7; see also Fox Sports Local Map, FOX
SPORTS, http://msn.foxsports.com/home/page/fsn (last visited Nov. 17, 2013) (showing map
of Fox Sports Regional Sports Networks and the teams that are broadcasted by those
networks).
209. Driving Directions to Great American Ball Park, GOOGLE MAPS,
http://goo.gl/maps/aL3nG (last visited Nov. 17, 2013); Blackout Map, supra note 133.
210. Blackouts FAQ, supra note 135.
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The second and most troublesome problem with the League’s
blackout policies relates to how many of the demarcated broadcasting
territories overlap one other. Although some territories only have one
team, other territories that do not have a local team and are
geographically in-between different teams’ local markets—such as the
entire state of Iowa and the greater Las Vegas area—have as many as six
teams claiming in-market broadcasting rights. 211 Outside of the
contiguous United States, the blackout policies are even broader; the
entire Canadian market is blacked out from Toronto Blue Jays games (in
addition to other teams in certain areas), and the U.S. territories of
Guam and the Virgin Islands are blacked out from every game. 212
Additionally, because the blackouts are enforced “regardless of whether
that Club is playing at home or away,” 213 fans in a market like Las
Vegas, which has six different teams claiming territorial rights, can have
up to twelve different teams that are blacked out on any given day.
Based on this information, both the non-competitive agreements and
the blackout policies in the way the League broadcasts games restrain
trade in violation of the Sherman Act. Yet, even with a removal of
baseball’s preferred antitrust status, the Garber plaintiffs must still
overcome the hurdle of the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (the
SBA). 214 The SBA, passed in 1961 to facilitate an agreement where the
NFL would sell a package of games to CBS, provides that
antitrust laws . . . shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among
persons . . . conducting the organized professional team sports of
football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs
participating in [these sports] sells or otherwise transfers all or any part
of the rights of such league’s member clubs in the sponsored
telecasting of the games of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, as
215
the case may be, engaged in or conducted by such clubs.

Yet, there are two specific reasons why the SBA should not be
applied here. The first comes from the Supreme Court’s analysis of
sports broadcasting in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma. 216 In this decision, the Court stated that, for broadcasts,
“[p]rice is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and
both are unresponsive to consumer preference. This latter point is
perhaps the most significant, since Congress designed the Sherman Act
211. Blackout Map, supra note 133.
212. Blackouts FAQ, supra note 135.
213. Id. (concluding that if each of the six teams claiming territorial-rights were playing
six completely different teams, all twelve of those teams would be blacked out).
214. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, 75 Stat. 732 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–95 (2012)).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1291; Ross, supra note 175, at 468–69.
216. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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as a consumer welfare prescription.” 217 Thus, to meet this “Rule of
Reason” standard, the Garber plaintiffs would have to prove that the
price of broadcasting is higher on consumers and the output of games is
“lower than it would otherwise be.” 218 As previously described, the
skyrocketing broadcasting contracts that are passed on to consumers, as
well as those consumers who are blacked out from watching games
entirely, would easily meet this standard.
In the NCAA case, however, the Supreme Court did not consider the
SBA at all because it only applies to professional sports. The Seventh
Circuit considered the SBA in the 1992 case Chicago Professional
Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA. 219 In this case, the Chicago Bulls filed
an antitrust suit against the NBA because of a rule limiting the number
of games that individual teams could license to network
“superstations.” 220 The court held that the SBA only applies “when the
league has transferred a right to sponsored telecasting,” and the NBA’s
national broadcasting contracts did not give a “right to limit
broadcasting of other contests.” 221 Another federal court reviewing the
SBA specifically held that “‘[s]ponsored telecasting’ under the SBA
pertains only to network broadcast television and does not apply to nonexempt channels of distribution such as cable television, pay-per-view,
and satellite television networks.” 222 Judge Scheindlin’s opinion of the
Garber case also addressed this point, stating that the rule of reason
“does not give league agreements regarding television rights blanket
immunity from antitrust scrutiny” and “may constitute an antitrust
violation.” 223
Therefore, in light of these interpretations of the SBA’s scope, as
well as the “Rule of Reason” standard from NCAA, the Southern District
of New York should not apply the SBA to the anticompetitive
broadcasting agreements at issue here. Any court reviewing a challenge
to the exemption must consider that “[a]ntitrust law is concerned with
the market, and hence, the needs of the consumers. The final decision,
then, should be more about protecting the rights of another stakeholder,
the fans of baseball.” 224 Accordingly, the court should find in favor of
the Garber plaintiffs, and hold that the League does not have an
exemption from antitrust law and conspired to restrict trade in violation
of the Sherman Act.
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Id. at 107 (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979)).
Ross, supra note 175, at 478.
Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 669.
Id. at 671.
Kingray, Inc. v. NBA, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
Laumann v. NHL, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 488–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Mozes & Glicksman, supra note 100, at 291.
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IV. PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE BROADCASTING PROCEDURES
This Note has highlighted why the Southern District of New York
should rule in favor of the Garber plaintiffs and hold that (1) baseball no
longer enjoys the status of being exempt from antitrust law and (2) the
broadcasting policies of the League unreasonably restrain trade in
violation of the Sherman Act. If the court does rule in favor of the
plaintiffs, it would no doubt be a huge blow to the League going
forward. However, no matter what the outcome of this case is, there are
steps the League can take to change its anticompetitive policies for the
mutual benefit of the League and its fans.
Although there are some avid baseball fans who would watch any
game being broadcast, arguably the vast majority of fans simply want to
watch their favorite team. 225 As a result, the solution that commentators
suggest “makes so much sense it’ll never happen” is to offer “a-la-carte”
pricing on games. 226 Using this method, fans could have access to just
the games they want by being able to purchase packages directly from
their favorite teams. As Stephen Ross and Stefan Szymanksi write (who
were also cited in the Garber complaint):
Absent the exclusive territorial arrangements agreed to by league
owners, individual teams would either directly, or more likely through
intermediaries, arrange for their own games to be available to out-ofmarket fans . . . . Fans wishing to see only their favorite team now pay
for more games than they want, so sports leagues are currently using
their monopoly power to effectuate a huge wealth transfer . . . . [L]ess
fanatic consumers would be willing to pay a more modest sum for their
favorite teams’ games only. As to these fans, the current scheme
227
reduces output.

Thus, while broadcasting packages may bring in less revenue on an
individual basis, the League would increase output to many more fans
by offering them the ability to see the games they want, and this increase
in viewership could compensate for lower per capita revenues.
Additionally, there is nothing keeping the League from providing
this system to fans because the technology is already available. 228
Through MLB Advanced Media (MLBAM), the League has the ability
to stream every live baseball game through the Internet on virtually any
device, and MLBAM is already used to show games through the MLB.tv

225. STEPHEN F. ROSS & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, FANS OF THE WORLD, UNITE!: A
(CAPITALIST) MANIFESTO FOR SPORTS CONSUMERS 25 (2008).
226. Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7.
227. ROSS & SZYMANSKI, supra note 225, at 15.
228. Jack Stuef, Inside the Major League Baseball Tech Startup That Could Change
Television, B UZZFEED (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.buzzfeed.com/jackstuef/inside-the-majorleague-baseball-tech-startup-that.

2013]

Blackout or Blackmail?

185

package. 229 If fans were allowed to purchase packages directly from the
teams they want to watch, the League could make every game available
through MLBAM.
Lastly, as stated in the American Needle opinion, “the interest in
maintaining a competitive balance among athletic teams is legitimate
and important.” 230 If live games were offered on an individual basis, it
would aid in the competitive balance of the League and make games
more interesting to watch. 231 As previously mentioned, the vast majority
of teams’ revenues come from the massive local television contracts that
are arranged with RSNs. 232 Because of this, teams that play in larger
television markets, such as Los Angeles or New York, can reach
agreements for massive television deals and afford to have more elite
players. 233 On the other hand, MLBAM is equally owned by all thirty of
the League’s member clubs, 234 and every dollar that goes through the
company is distributed evenly. 235 Thus, by circumventing the need to go
through RSNs entirely, each team would receive an equal share of the
broadcasting revenue and not be concerned with the size of the
television market where that team is located. In turn, cable companies
would not have to be locked into huge contracts with RSNs, where the
high costs are passed on to consumers who may not even watch baseball
at all. 236
CONCLUSION
In this lawsuit, the Garber plaintiffs have the chance to make history
and bring about significant changes that would improve baseball for
years to come. As stated most poignantly by Yahoo! Sports writer Jeff
Passan:
Garber et al v. MLB is the workaround code for the working person. It
is the suit behind which every baseball fan should stand. It’s 2012,
where everything is available everywhere, and pure greed is keeping
baseball off our TVs, our tablets, our laptops and our phones. If
baseball refuses to budge on an issue so archaic, so absurd and so
blatant in its indifference toward people who want to buy one of their
products, the league should suffer through the embarrassment of
getting clowned by the fans whom it clowns with black TV screens. It

229. Id.
230. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)).
231. Stuef, supra note 228.
232. Id.
233. See Shaikin & Baxter, supra note 183.
234. Stuef, supra note 228.
235. Passan, Blackout Problem, supra note 7.
236. Stelter & Chozick, supra note 193.
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may move slowly – most antitrust lawsuits do—but if this succeeds, it
237
will be a decades-forward leap in one fell swoop.

Garber v. MLB is the chance for the League to finally reexamine
their antiquated broadcasting policies and develop a new strategy that
works for an increasingly technological and international new generation
of baseball fans. No matter the outcome of the case, MLB has the
opportunity to make ground-breaking modernizations that would shake
up the sports world and solidify its namesake as the “national pastime”
for decades to come.
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